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 The autonomy of law: an epistemological perspective 
The aim of my paper is to envisage how the role of law will be re-designed in relation 
to the evolution of information and communication technologies (ICT). The hypothesis pro-
posed in this paper is that law will keep having an autonomous and central epistemological 
role in representing reality, namely, in providing a mediation which will enable us to bridge 
the physical and the virtual realms, the empirical convergence of which does not account by 
itself for the construction of a common epistemological ground.       
This hypothesis is not intended to underestimate the change determined by the techno-
logical computer-based revolution, which tends to transform “the basic nature or the scope of 
the activity or institution”1 to which technology applies. The transformation of reality result-
ing from technological developments is not only quantitative but also qualitative: the com-
puter-based technological revolution not only widens the range of our own interrogations but 
it also changes the meaning of our questioning.2 In more appropriate terms, this means that, 
even though transformation (which applies both to the world and to human beings)3 is a cru-
cial key in order to understand the technological evolution, a qualitative analysis does not re-
search, in the transformed phenomenon (object, activity, institution or human being), the ex-
plication of the transformation (the technical principle). Such explication is to be researched 
in the transformation of the inquiry through which this phenomenon is investigated and cogni-
tively represented. 
When reflecting upon a determined activity realised by means of a technological de-
vice, we first ask ourselves how efficiently the computer performs this activity. Once the 
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  J. MOOR, “What is computer ethics?”, in T. WARD BYNUM (ed.), Computers & Ethics, Malden 
Mass., Blackwell Publisher, 1985, pp. 266-275. 
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(Mass.), MIT Press, 1948, and The Human Use of Human Beings, Anchor, Doubleday, 1954.  
 technological application has become part of the performance of such an activity, then we ask 
ourselves what are the nature and the value of this activity. This stratified inquiry governs 
how a phenomenon transformed by the technological evolution is progressively investigated 
and cognitively represented as being part of the technological reality. The evolution of tech-
nology not only plays a role in determining reality but also in shaping its representation and 
appraisal.     
This is the reason why, when we reflect upon the consequences of the application of 
technology to the world of law, we end up wondering about the nature of law and the direc-
tion of its evolution of law, which is not only empirically but also conceptually absorbed 
within the ongoing technological revolution. This direction is necessarily connected with the 
direction of the technological revolution, which is mainly expressed by the ability to rapidly4 
transform the world and determine, from an epistemological perspective, a specific reality 
made of both an analogical and a digital dimension. This line of evolution is focused upon a 
representation of the world as subject to continuous transformation: the world (which is the 
referent of the discourse about globalisation, mondialisation5) is considered more and more in 
its own possibility, in its virtual or possible states-of-the-world, rather than in its positive real-
ity, namely, in its fixed or stable dimension. In more philosophical terms, it is the case of a 
(representation of the) world in which what is held as stable (what we can rely upon either to 
take a decision or to behave) is no longer determined nor explained by an ontology founded 
upon the positive existence of a material, real object, but by a different and new ontology, 
founded upon the non-contradictory content of an information that is concerned with the pos-
sible states-of-the-world. This ontology cannot be simply accounted for in terms of a digital 
ontology as opposed to an analogical ontology. Both of them are only epistemological de-
scriptions of the world6, which cannot pretend to state what reality is (metaphysics) but only 
how reality can be experienced and conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of 
abstraction (epistemology). In this line of research, it appears more promising, for instance, to 
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  See on this point P. VIRILIO, La vitesse de libération, Paris, Galilée, 1995, and Vitesse et politique, 
Paris, Galilée, 1977. On this perspective see S. REDHEAD, Paul Virilio: Theorist For An Accelerated Culture, 
Toronto, University Press of Toronto, 2004.  
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  J.-L. NANCY, La création du monde ou la mondialisation, Paris, Galilée, 2002. 
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 envisage an informational ontology, according to which knowledge of the world is knowledge 
of its structures (intended as sets of data)7.         
 
 Law as legal science: stabilization of expectations and mediation  
Intended as legal science, law has always played a paramount role in the epistemo-
logical perspective, namely, in the representation of reality. Legal science has constructed the 
possibility to mediate between the real (what is) and the virtual (what ought to be) reality 
within the physical domain. The virtual reality of law (what ought to be) has never been only 
an infinite adjournment of the real world (what is) but it has always entailed a specific form of 
reality with its own language, consistency and categories (legal science). In addition to this, 
we should notice that law has not only served as a mediation between the virtual and the real 
world but it has also set the limits of representation of one term within the epistemological 
domain of the other, through the distinction between de facto (the phenomenon to be repre-
sented in legal terms) and de iure (the conditions of possibility of representation) questions. 
However, this distinction belongs more to the epistemology of law than to a descrip-
tion of reality, that is to say that such a distinction accounts for a different and layered repre-
sentation of how reality can be understood rather than for a description of how reality is: this 
does not mean that law produces its own reality (constructivism) but only the means to repre-
sent and understand it, precisely in the topological sense in which a map (that is both a mean 
and a piece of knowledge) represents a determined space, in order to reduce the complexity of 
such environment and allow people to orientate themselves within it (ecological information).  
The evolution of law that stems from the technological computer-based revolution has, 
thus, to be considered primarily from a theoretical point of view, namely, from an epistemo-
logical perspective, rather than from a merely empirical one. As pointed out, we should never 
lose sight of the fact that law is not only concerned with the control of critical situations but is 
epistematical in itself, i.e. capable of producing a specific knowledge. Within the framework 
of the information society, where information is meant to entail an ordered series of possible 
states-of-the-world and therefore regularity, the evolution of law has to be thought of as the 
evolution of the science of what is possible, intended in a Kantian sense, as what possesses a 
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 non-contradictory content and it conforms to the conditions of both intuition (de facto) and 
thought (de iure)8.  
Contradiction has always nourished law, which has also been conceived as the attempt 
to overcome contradiction. The possible contradiction between the functioning of the virtual 
and of the real world, i.e. the consistency of the digital and analogical reality, is likely to un-
dermine or at least to menace the conditions of possibility of an ordered communication 
within the society of information. The question is not to oppose a disposition to change (tech-
nology) to a pretension to stability (law). On the contrary, it deals with the recognition of 
what can be taken for stable in what changes, in order to make the flow of information and 
communication ordered and effective. In other words, law is likely to be kept charged with 
the role of stabilisation of expectations, but we should wonder what it means now to stabilise 
expectations within the networked information society. 
The role to be assigned to law cannot be limited in the networked society of informa-
tion to the norm’s predictive power, on the basis of which the norm is expected to foresee and 
measure human behaviours and to govern reality. How can law govern reality, when the latter 
is subject to continuous transformation? Law is not to be opposed to the technological evolu-
tion (both law and technology belong to, and thus stem from, the development of human cul-
ture) but is meant to progressively become part of the informational system. In our view, law 
will be (kept) charged with an essential role, namely, the role of mediation between the real 
and the virtual world. 
  
 The concept and role of mediation 
Mediation is the action of serving as intermediary between two terms: i.e. one term, 
from which the reasoning starts, and another term, to which the reasoning is leading, since the 
act of mediation is the condition for the representation of the second term within the episte-
mological realm of the first one.  
The concept of mediation is based on a philosophical assumption, which is central to 
our analysis, namely that nothing is simply given as a stable, assured basis for something else. 
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  See on this point, G. DICKER, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. An Analytical Introduction, Oxford/New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 79: “For Kant, to say that something is possible is not to say only that it 
is logically possible or free of contradiction: this is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Rather, to say 
that something is possible means that it conforms to the conditions of both intuition and thought; as Kant states it 
in the First Postulate: ‘That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience, that is, with the conditions of 
intuition and of concepts, is possible’”. 
 In epistemological terms, nothing is either immediately present in its conceptual meaning or is 
evident by itself in the thought process (neither the “real world” nor the “virtual reality”). This 
was already affirmed as the fundamental principle of Kantian epistemology: intuitions with-
out concepts are blind, concepts without intuitions are void.9 On the contrary, every phe-
nomenon is to be represented and thought of by means of mediations. In this perspective, me-
diation is not conceived as a simple relation between two terms, since a relation compounds 
two already established terms. Mediation is intended as a dynamic process of thought (such as 
a legal reasoning) within which progressive connections represent and establish terms. 
Through the act of mediation, something (phenomena, terms or data) can be assumed as the 
stable basis for the representation and the comprehension of something else.  
The concept of mediation denies abstract unrelatedness, and affirms the possibility of 
complex relatedness among phenomena. Therefore, mediation entails, from an epistemologi-
cal perspective, a denial of a world (both real and virtual) of unrelated elements. On the con-
trary, it endows the world with the possibility of communication between the real and the vir-
tual. A mediated world turns out to be more than the sum of static, empirical relations among 
agents of the real and the virtual world: it grows out of the communication process between 
epistemological stances and exists in the tension of their mutual becoming a real and a virtual 
world. In this perspective, the act of mediation is the condition of representation of the virtual 
reality within the epistemology of the real world and vice versa. This allows one term or en-
tity of the real/virtual reality to be taken as the stable basis for the representation and compre-
hension of another term within the epistemology that describes how the real/virtual world can 
be experienced and conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction.  
For instance, while punishing the online theft of identity, made possible by the current 
informatics’ technologies, we do not only judge a behaviour as being illegal, but we also en-
dow the virtual identity with a real consistency, by delimiting to what conditions it is possible 
to rely upon the set of data concerning the online personal identity. In this perspective, as out-
lined before, we end up qualifying, at least to some extent, what is an online personal identity, 
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  A significant interpretation of Kantian epistemology is offered by J. MCDOWELL, Mind and World, 
Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 3: “The overall I am going to consider in these lectures is the way 
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sion of the way thought bears on reality”. And p. 4: “So the picture is this: the fact that thoughts are not empty, 
the fact that thoughts have representational content, emerges out of an interplay of concepts and intuitions”.   
 not only in strict, legal terms, but rather at the level of inter-subjective communication, i.e. of 
symmetrical and mutual reliance on information.  
As a term can be represented and assumed as the stable basis for something else, this 
provides the epistemic agent with a predictive power. Such a predictive power shall be judged 
according to the interplay of the real and the virtual world within the information society. 
Since there is no prediction without representation, the conditions of possibility of representa-
tion set the structural limits of any predictive power. These conditions of possibility are to be 
considered within the epistemology of law, which assumes such conditions as the necessary 
presuppositions of the norm’s predictive power.   
The prediction set forth by the norm of positive law displays an informational content 
that enables us to stabilise our expectations. It allows us to behave in a free manner, namely, 
by foreseeing and measuring the predicted effects of our actions. This informational content 
appears to be, however, more and more static compared to the transformation of the world 
(this is an old argument renewed by the technological evolution) and to the flow of informa-
tional resources shared throughout the networks (this is a new argument determined by the 
information and communication technologies). The informational content of the norm is 
likely to rapidly become contradictory with the augmented reality of the infosphere, i.e. “the 
whole informational environment constituted by all informational entities (thus including in-
formational agents as well), their properties, interactions process and mutual relations”.10  
In this perspective, law has to become part of the informational system; in contrast to a 
widespread opinion, this does not mean that law is either overcome or determined by technol-
ogy. On the contrary, law keeps its own specificity, precisely thanks to its ability to mediate 
between the real and the virtual world. This act of mediation requires a translation of the vir-
tual information displayed by technology, namely, the possibility opened and made available 
by the application of new ICT, into real information. The reality of information is no longer 
based upon the positive existence of a real, material object; actually, it is based upon the non-
contradictory content of information, on which it is held reasonable to rely, in order to take a 
decision and behave.  
From this consideration a basic principle should be inferred and established as a firm 
premise of our line of reasoning: it is possible to set an ordered form of communication only 
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 on the basis of reliance upon relevant information,11 shared at an inter-subjective level.12 The 
inner rationality of the multi-agent system of the networked society of information is not to be 
found in a set of certainties (from which the legal order ought to be deduced) but in its attitude 
to cope both with the flood of information deriving from the upgrading of social networks and 
the structural lack of knowledge13 characterizing the asymmetry between environmental and 
systemic information.   
 
 Mediating between the real and the virtual in the information society      
According to our opinion, in the information society law will be thus mainly meant to 
play the role of mediation between the virtual and the real, namely, to ensure the conditions of 
reliance upon information in both directions: a) from the virtual reality to the real world: in 
this context, the concept of virtuality is endowed with a real content constituted by the idea of 
foreseeable consequences, whose importance and extension are progressively subject to the 
convergence of online and offline life. This delineates, according to many authors, the most 
relevant trend of the networked information society: “Nowadays, we are used to considering 
the space of information as something we log-in to and log-out from. Our view of the world 
(our metaphysics) is still modern or Newtonian: it is made of ‘dead’ cars, buildings, furniture, 
clothes, which are non-interactive, irresponsive and incapable of communicating, learning, or 
memorizing. But what we still experience as the world offline is bound to become a fully in-
teractive and responsive environment of wireless, pervasive, distributed, a2a (anything to 
anything) information process, that works a4a (anywhere for anytime), in real time. This will 
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  See T. MALDONADO, Reale e virtuale, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2007, p. 151: “Nessuno può ormai negare 
che la nostra percezione è satura di valori e disvalori, di giudizi e pregiudizi; sostenere però che essa non ci dica 
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del reale è inseparabile dal problema dell’affidabilità (o meno) della nostra percezione del mondo reale”. See 
also T. BERNERS-LEE, Weaving the Web. The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web 
by Its Inventor, New York, Harper One, 1999. 
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  In this perspective see M. DURANTE, “What Model of Trust for Networked Cooperation? Online 
Social Trust in the Production of Common Goods (Knowledge Sharing)”, in T.W. BYNUM, M. CAL-
ZAROSSA, I. DE LOTTO, S. ROGERSON (ed.), “Living, Working and Learning Beyond Technology”, Pro-
ceedings of the Tenth International Conference Ethicomp 2008, Mantova, University Press, 2008, pp. 211-223.  
13
  See on this point U. PAGALLO, “Something Beyond Technology: Some Remarks On Ignorance And 
Its Role In Evolution”, in T.W. BYNUM, M. CALZAROSSA, I. DE LOTTO, S. ROGERSON (ed.), “Living, 
Working and Learning Beyond Technology”, o.c., pp. 623-631. 
 first gently invite us to understand the world as something ‘alive’ (artificially live). Such ani-
mation of the world will, paradoxically, make our outlook closer to that of pre-technological 
cultures which interpreted all aspects of nature as inhabited by technological forces”;14 b) from 
the real world to the virtual reality: in this context, the concept of virtuality is endowed with a 
real content constituted by the idea of reliance on information. We have thus to shed light on 
this idea with regard to its pragmatic and gnoseological relevance. Reliance on information is 
a condition for a rational theory of decisions and actions. In order to decide or behave on the 
basis of rational criteria, I rely upon information: they are sensory data from reality (worldly 
ontology) or the content of knowledge (documental ontology) or instructions to behave (rules 
of conduct). According to Floridi, we can speak of information as reality; information on real-
ity and information for reality.15 Deciding and acting on the basis of reliable information has 
(a) the pragmatic aim of rationally guiding our decisions or actions toward a determined goal 
(according to a degree of probability of success) and (b) the gnoseological aim of measuring 
our decisions and actions by reference with an assumed parameter given by available infor-
mation. Providing decisions and actions with a set of information implies giving supplemen-
tary information to the system (in terms of positive or negative feedback): this information 
has both descriptive (the conditions of reliance) and normative content (the degree of coher-
ence between information and the results of decisions or actions).16 The role of law as a me-
diation between the virtual and the real thus requires a more accurate analysis of the following 
conditions.  
 
a. From the virtual reality to the real world 
Law displays its role of mediation from the virtual reality to the real world, by endow-
ing the virtual reality with a real content that is able to be appraised in the physical domain. 
This happens by means of terms of legal responsibility: it is within the real world that I am 
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  See L. FLORIDI, “A look into the future impact of ICT on our lives”, o.c., p. 7. 
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  The tripartite epistemological distinction of information can be found in L. FLORIDI, “Trends in the 
philosophy of information”, http://www.philosophyofinformation.net, p. 8. For an analysis of such a distinction 
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  See on this point M. DURANTE, “What Model of Trust for Networked Cooperation? Online Social 
Trust in the Production of Common Goods (Knowledge Sharing)”, in T.W. BYNUM, M. CALZAROSSA, I. 
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 responsible for (the effects of) actions displayed within the virtual reality. In other words, le-
gal responsibility is meant to measure the friction that an action or operation performed 
through computers in the virtual reality generates out of the domain of its technological appli-
cation.  
The virtual reality is a representation (either by analogical or digital models) of reality 
through which some objects are substituted by some other ‘objects’. In this perspective, the 
virtual reality is an autonomous reality since the new objects, which design a reality with an 
economy of means or with a novel arrangement of them, produce a new form of knowledge.17 
The relation with the virtual reality is established by means of intuition (visual, acoustic per-
ception of the new objects), conceptualisation (appraisal of the content of the new objects) or 
interaction (modification of the new objects by means of interactive technological devices). 
These types of relation are based on a specific epistemology, which does not explain what the 
virtual reality is but how it can be experienced and conceptualised by an epistemic agent at a 
given level of abstraction. This form of knowledge is necessarily and progressively elaborated 
on the basis of the sets of data (the new objects), which structure the context of the virtual re-
ality: this context allows us to say that we behave and act within the virtual reality. In this per-
spective, how can we say whether and when the effects of an action performed within the vir-
tual reality encounter the real world?    
Coming back to the real world is only made possible out of the forms of relation with 
the representation of the (virtual) reality. Coming back to the real world requires translating 
the acquired knowledge within the epistemological realm where the effects of the actions dis-
played within the virtual reality are to be appraised and judged. One of the possible situations 
in which the effects of an action performed within the virtual reality encounters the real world 
is given by the factual circumstances where one is held responsible by someone else for those 
consequences within the real world. For one to be held responsible, it is required that the con-
sequences of one’s actions performed within the virtual reality were to some extent foresee-
able within the epistemology describing how the real world can be experienced and conceptu-
alised by an epistemic agent at a given level of abstraction. In such a perspective, law is en-
trenched with the epistemic role of appraising in what terms the effects of an action per-
formed in the virtual reality can be judged foreseeable and thus accountable in the real world. 
This requires the legal science to establish the conditions of the representation of one term 
within the epistemological realm of another one. The foreseeable effects of an action are to be 
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 appraised in terms of legal responsibility. This does not mean that legal categories immedi-
ately apply to the technological reality nor it means that the virtual reality regulates itself by 
means of technological devices. On the contrary, according to the aforementioned Moor’s 
thesis, it means that, when technology concerns the question of prediction, law is entrenched 
with the epistemic role of explaining how the consequences of an action can be experienced 
and conceptualised, in legal terms, as foreseeable effects both in the virtual and in the real 
world.  
Needless to say, in our opinion the role of mediation is mainly worked out by means 
of legal adjudication, which not only consists in hearing and settling a case by judicial proce-
dure but also in stabilising epistemic expectations, which mediate between the virtual and the 
real world. This aspect of the role of mediation of law poses both a phenomenological and a 
hermeneutical problem. 
From a phenomenological point of view, the progressive convergence of online and 
offline life displaces the concept of prediction, which is no longer entrenched exclusively with 
the aim of inferring a future behaviour from a past one, but is also more and more concerned 
with the attempt of appraising the cognitive limits of the agents’ representation of reality and 
of their rational capacity of acting,18 which can enable us to correct our own predictions and to 
judge what can be held as a reasonable expectation. However, the progressive convergence of 
online and offline life does not displaces the function of law, since there is still a difference 
between what is empirically held as a foreseeable effect and what is legitimately expected to 
be held, at an inter-subjective level, as a foreseeable effect.  
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  See G. SARTOR, “Gli agenti software: nuovi soggetti del cyberdiritto”, http://www.cirsfid.unibo.it., 
2007, p. 81: “La conoscenza dei principi del funzionamento dell’agente e l’analisi del suo comportamento nel 
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diversa la strategia che adottiamo di regola nei confronti dei nostri simili: la nostra conoscenza dei limiti, delle 
idiosincrasie, delle attitudini di ciascuno non offre una base sufficiente per prevedere il comportamento altrui 
(tranne che nel caso di comportamenti dettati da riflessi automatici o da pulsioni incontrollabili). Tale 
conoscenza ci consente però di integrare e correggere l’ipotesi che ciascuno tenda a perseguire i propri scopi in 
modo razionale: possiamo spiegare e prevedere il comportamento umano combinando l’ipotesi generale della 
razionalità di ciascuno con la conoscenza dei limiti di tale razionalità nei singoli casi”.  
 From a hermeneutical point of view, the role of mediation of law by means of legal re-
sponsibility faces a different problem. In the ontology based on the physical reality the terms 
of legal responsibility are expected to be interpreted either within the context where the action 
took place or within the context where the action displayed its own effect (they often happen 
to be the same or at least to be both regulated by international law). What is the semantic con-
text within which the actions or the effects of actions are to be legally interpreted within the 
networked society of information? The problem is not only concerned with legal boundaries 
(with the limits of both public and private international law) but also with symbolic universes: 
this is, in our opinion, the main problem that law has to face in its role of mediation between 
the real and the virtual, since data, phenomena, concepts, categories and the consequences of 
actions displayed within the virtual reality are likely to be culturally appraised in terms that 
refer to different symbolic universes.19 The activity of mediation, by means of which one term 
can be represented within the epistemological realm of another one, presupposes, as we said, 
the possibility of a complex relatedness among data, that is to say, a unified symbolic uni-
verse. In addition to this, we should notice that the development of the semantic web and for-
mal ontology is an important but only partial answer to the problem, since this development 
mainly aims at coping with the interpretation of (legal) texts rather than with the present de-
limitation of (legal) contexts. While the information and communication technology (ICT) is 
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  See in this perspective S. MCROBB, Y. ORITO, K. MURATA, A. ADAMS, “Towards an Explora-
tion of Cross-cultural Factors in Privacy Online”, in T. WARD BYNUM, S. ROGERSON, K. MURATA 
(ed.), Glocalisation: Bridging the Global Nature of Information and Communication Technology and the Local 
Nature of Human Beings, vol. II, Global e-SCM Research Centre, Tokyo, Meiji University, 2007, pp. 380-385, 
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behaviours associated with privacy in societies whose cultural compass points elsewhere than West”. In the same 
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Nature of Information and Communication Technology and the Local Nature of Human Beings, vol. II, o.c., pp. 
448-455, at p. 454: “Our proposal is made from a Japanese perspective. This may raise concerns about the effec-
tiveness of the revised concept in the global context. However, because ICT is advancing on a global scale, the 
revised concept could become mandatory for a wide range of countries. Our proposal is the first step towards 
developing a globally acceptable concept of the right to information privacy that is appropriate for the modern 
information age. Societies could realise this concept through the integration of opinions about the right to such 
privacy based on local sociocultural and economic situations”.  
 advancing on a global scale, the role of mediation of law appears to be, often, linguistically 
and/or culturally located.  
 
b. From the real world to the virtual reality 
Law displays its role of mediation, furthermore, from the real world to the virtual real-
ity, by giving a real content to the real world that can be appraised within the virtual reality, 
by means of informational reliance. It is within the virtual reality that I rely on informational 
data, in order to perform actions that are likely to produce (legal) effects within the real world. 
In other words, if the virtual dimension of information and communication technology (ICT) 
is to be found in its ability to transform the world in the content of an information, the virtual 
dimension of law (as a mediation from the real world to the virtual reality) is to be found in its 
ability to set the conditions according to which it is possible to rely on the content of informa-
tion processed and exchanged within the networked information society. In order to rely upon 
information, epistemic agents have to either explicitly or implicitly set a norm which should 
allow them to recognise intersubjectively what is reasonable to believe in and expect. In the 
absence of such normative dimension, the communication spread in the networked informa-
tion society is radically exposed to the chance of being disordered and ineffective.      
In this perspective, law can play a fundamental role of mediation between the real and 
the virtual to the extent that it assures reliance upon information. This does not amount at say-
ing that the virtual reality of the networked information society should be subject to ruling: in 
this line of reasoning, the mediation of law is called forth only by reference to its normative 
function of stabilisation of expectations. This aspect of mediation poses topological problems 
both with respect to (1) information and communication technologies and with respect to (2) 
networked cooperation.  
 
b.1. Information and communication technologies 
In relation to information and communication technologies (ICT) the function-of-law 
consists (a) in creating filters of relevance and reliability, in order to select relevant and reli-
able information (data and channels of information), and (b) in establishing means of modera-
 tion and meta-moderation, in order to ensure an ordered communication, without reaffirming 
forms of control after decentralisation.20 
A) Filters of relevance and reliability. 
Communication in the networked information society has to be ordered21 to be effec-
tive. This requires to elaborating means by which it is possible to filter information in terms 
of relevance and reliability. Needless to say that the creation of filters of relevance and reli-
ability is likely to suffer from problems of agency, i.e. any selection is by itself significant and 
thus possesses the normative power of conveying (more or less perceptible) values.  
However, the elaboration of these filters in the networked information society does not 
depend necessarily on centred and hierarchical choices (related to the ownership of channels 
of information). On the contrary, it has been proved22 to depend on decentred and horizontal 
practices displayed by a plurality of users by means of distributed networks.23 More precisely, 
there are at least two ways to create filters of relevance and reliability through the coordina-
tion of individual actions. This coordination can be either the result of the users’ cooperative 
will or the outcome of their spontaneous interaction.  
Internet users can voluntarily create means by which information is judged as relevant 
and reliable thanks to an assessment that has been progressively formed by the pronounces 
and/or the practices of a plurality of individuals, whose interaction allow them to reach a goal 
they would not be able to achieve by themselves. This is made possible by all technological 
filters of relevance and reliability created, in a distributed manner, in accordance with a teleo-
logical hierarchy. I define as such a hierarchy of values, the ordering of which is constructed 
with the scope of achieving a previously shared goal of a common concern.24 
                                                 
20
  For a detailed analysis of this question, R.A. GALLOWAY, Protocol. How Control Exists after De-
centralization, Cambridge (Mass.), MIT Press, 2004. See also R.A. GALLOWAY & E. THACKER, The Ex-
ploit: A Theory of Networks, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2007.    
21
  The idea has been defended against criticism in M. DURANTE, Il futuro del web: etica, diritto, 
decentramento. Dalla sussidiarietà digitale all’economia dell’informazione in rete, o.c., pp. 259-273.  
22
  See in this perspective, Y. BENKLER, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms 
Markets and Freedom, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 215-220. 
23
  For a critical account of this notion see R.A. GALLOWAY & E. THACKER, The Exploit: A Theory 
of Networks, o.c., p. 3: “In contrast to Lovink, we maintain that in recent decades the process of globalization 
have mutated from a  system of control housed in a relatively small number of power hubs to a system of control 
infused into the material fabric of distributed networks”.  
24
  For such an idea see M. DURANTE, Il futuro del web: etica, diritto, decentramento. Dalla 
sussidiarietà digitale all’economia dell’informazione in rete, o.c., p. 201: “[…] se di gerarchia si può ancora 
 Internet users can, furthermore, elaborate filters of relevance and reliability as a result 
of a non-programmed action, that is to say in a spontaneous manner (cosmological order).25 In 
this case, the coordination of individual actions is made possible by the specific configuration 
of networked interactions (according to topological models26 that we cannot expound here), 
which tend to select information both in a relevant and ordered way. This process of selection 
is based on clusters of shared contents, common interests, and the presence of hubs, which 
filter and catalyse the informational resources distributed in the web. On the one hand, this 
may result, at a macroscopic level, as a non-democratic27 distribution of information (power 
law distribution: very few websites has the majority of links and the majority of websites has 
very few links). On the other hand, this means that communication is made possible, at a re-
gional level, since information is guided towards local communities by interests of common 
concern, as it is described by the topological effects of clustering, cross-linking and small 
worlds.28   
B) Means of moderation and meta-moderation. 
Communication in the networked information society implies inter-subjective interac-
tions, which need to be moderated, in order to enable users to equally and fruitfully partici-
pate in the community of discussion. In this perspective, the function-of-law consists in estab-
                                                                                                                                                        
parlare, preferiamo allora qualificarla come gerarchia orientata ad un fine comune: è l’orientamento alla 
protezione del fine comune che designa il principio di misura e legittimità dell’atto d’autorità insito in ogni 
processo di revisione e accreditamento, per quanto esso sia orizzontale e decentrato”. 
25
  The idea of a cosmological order has been suggested by F. HAYEK, Law, Legislation and Liberty, 
London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982.  
26
  See on this note n. 28. See also R.A. GALLOWAY & E. THACKER, The Exploit: A Theory of Net-
works, o.c., p. 13: “By ‘thinking topologically’, we mean an approach that compares the abstract spaces of dif-
ferent structural or architectonic systems. Pyramidal hierarchy and distributed networks, for examples, have two 
different topologies of organizations and control”.  
27
  See on this point A.L. BARABÁSI, Linked, Cambridge, Perseus Edition, 2002. See also C. SHIRKY, 
“Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality”, http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw_weblog.html.  
28
  For an account of networked topological effects, Y. BENKLER, The Wealth of Networks: How Social 
Production Transforms Markets and Freedom, o.c., pp. 300-320. On the topological configuration of small 
worlds paradigm see in particular, D.J. WATTS – S.H. STROGATZ, “Collective dynamics of ‘Small-World’ 
Networks”, in Nature, 393, 1998, pp. 440-442; D.J. WATTS, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks be-
tween Order and Randomness, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999; see also U. PAGALLO, “‘Small 
world’ paradigm in social sciences: problems and perspectives”, in T. WARD BYNUM, S. ROGERSON, K. 
MURATA (ed.), Glocalisation: Bridging the Global Nature of Information and Communication Technology 
and the Local Nature of Human Beings, o.c., vol. II, pp. 456-465.      
 lishing means of moderation, i.e. the social norms regulating the discussion, and metamodera-
tion, i.e. the social norms regulating how the norms of discussion are to be chosen and ap-
plied.  
We consider a community of discussion,29 which does not adopt a process of selection 
of information that makes, ex ante, a distinction between what can be published and what has 
to be prevented from publishing. The process of publishing is based on an ex post peer review 
system of selection. This means that this community endorses both a principle of freedom and 
a principle of responsibility: the former asserts each participant’s freedom to post whatsoever 
information, the latter requires the participants to establish shared means of moderation and 
metamoderation, in order to revise information.  
The process of moderation, adopted by the community of discussion, is decentred and 
horizontal, as it is based on the distributed power of evaluation of each moderator selected by 
the community. Even if distributed, this normative power has to be subject to further control 
by means of metamoderation, which is also a decentralised and horizontal mechanism of revi-
sion. The concept of metamoderation consists in the idea that every judgement should be sub-
ject to further judgement. This does not necessarily entail an infinite regression, since meta-
moderation is implicitly judged by its ability to determine a fruitful and ordered discussion 
within the community.  
The legal constitution of such a community deserves consideration. The community is 
neither constituted exclusively on inclusion nor does it on exclusion. Its constitution endorses 
both a norm including every statement in the discussion and a norm excluding some of them 
from there. The community does not formulate a judgement on what is included but asserts a 
judgement on what is excluded. This means that the community is not involved in the process 
of deciding what can be a priori conceived as just, but is indeed concerned with the process of 
establishing what can be a posteriori conceived as unjust, that is to say that cannot be ac-
cepted within the discussion.30       
 
b.2. Networked social cooperation 
                                                 
29
  We consider the example of moderation and metamoderation offered by the multilevel technological 
platform adopted by a community of discussion as Slashdot. See on this point D. TAPSCOTT –A.D. WIL-
LIAMS, Wikinomics: How Mass Collaboration Changes Everything, New York, Portfolio, 2006, pp. 144-145.  
30
  See in this perspective, even tough in the context of a different line of reasoning, what has been af-
firmed by P. RICŒUR, Le juste, Paris, Esprit, 1995.  
 Networked social cooperation not only requires to relying on the information of others 
when deciding or behaving under the conditions of uncertainty resulting from the complexity 
of virtual environment, but also on someone’s else behaviour (delegation). This raises a nor-
mative question as regards interpersonal interaction: must interaction be based on a previously 
established norm, in order to promote cooperation? Or is such a norm likely to grow out of the 
interpersonal interaction? Before trying to answer such a question, we should focus our atten-
tion upon the fact that the idea of establishing a norm regulating the interpersonal interaction 
already implies a certain degree of distrust (in the relations between agents).  
The computer-mediated interaction or coordination between agents or groups may re-
quire thus different forms of normative mediation, either founded upon (a) distrust systems of 
mediation or upon (b) trust systems of mediation. The former is mainly concerned with tech-
nological and legal security (assured by means of rules, constraints, architectures, controls, 
and protocols), while the latter is mainly concerned with mental and social dispositions to-
wards other agents.31 Technological or legal security is necessary in regards to online com-
mercial transactions, privacy issues, and legal contracts, but it does not suffice to assure net-
worked social cooperation In fact, this is based on someone else’s behaviour, on their willing-
ness to cooperate with us that is never fully predictable. A trust system of mediation allows 
the trustier to evaluate the trustee’s willingness and ability to fulfil expectations. 
A) Distrust systems of mediation. 
Internet users set norms or technological devices since they do not trust the agents to 
whom they delegate tasks. This system shows a negative attitude towards agents, since it ap-
plies when they do not fulfil expectations. When things are expected to go wrong, there is no 
particular concern for the goal to achieve. This system externalises concern for the goal, 
whose protection and fulfilment are attributed to a third party (normative mediation): the au-
thority. This consists of two elements: a) the norm (legal rules or technological devices) set 
before the trustier and the trustee enter into a relation; b) the institution that administers and 
applies the norm established to regulate the relation between parties. The system based on dis-
trust is ultimately based on trust, since the trustier has to trust the ability of the norm to fore-
see when the agents will not fulfil expectations and, above all, the ability of the authority to 
                                                 
31
  This perspective has been widely expounded by C. CASTELFRANCHI & R. FALCONE, “Social 
Trust: Cognitive Anatomy, Social Importance, Quantification and Dynamics”, Proceedings of the first Workshop 
on Deception, Fraud and Trust in Agent Societies, Minneapolis/St. Paul, 1998, pp. 35-49. More recently, see 
also of the same authors, “Trust Theory”, 2007, http://www.istc.cnr.it/T3/trust, and “Socio-Cognitive Model of 
Trust: Basic Ingredients”, 2008, http://www.istc.cnr.it/T3/trust.  
 apply the violated norm. This normative mediation entails high transaction costs32 in setting 
up an institutional authority to be trusted and feared and applying the norms regulating the 
interpersonal interaction. 
B) Trust systems of mediation. 
The trustier believes that the trustee will act according to predictions. This system in-
ternalises concern for the goal. A positive attitude is motivated by the Internet users’ shared 
concern for the task to be fulfilled. This model applies when the desired outcome is produced. 
This system does not seem to refer to an institutional authority (normative mediation). How-
ever, it is a relationship based on a particular type of authority. This consists of two elements: 
a) the social norm set by the relation between agents. Trust itself sets a norm that grows out of 
the dynamic sphere of the communication process (interpersonal interaction): both the trustier 
and the trustee are aware of the fact that the latter is somehow indebted to the former, since 
the trustier has given the trustee some credit;33 b) information concerning the trustee’s behav-
iour. The act of trusting and the act of fulfilling expectations release mutual information that 
can be shared and processed within the web or a community (the system in relation to the vir-
tual environment). The authority of trust lies in the possibility of tracking and sharing this in-
formation. It is a form of control by means of information feedback: negative feedback cor-
rects an incorrect prediction; positive feedback supports the process of communication.  
A trust system of mediation, built as a result of relations between agents and the stabi-
lisation of their mutual expectations, determines a normative dimension that can reach beyond 
technological and legal security, since it is not affected by obsolescence (because it grounds 
expectations on the ongoing conditions of party relations) nor does it require full information 
                                                 
32
  P. AIGRAIN, “The Individual and the Collective in Open Information Communities”, Proceedings 
BLED Electronic Commerce Conference, 9-11 June 2003, http://paigrain.debatpublic.net: “Transaction costs are 
much more than the monetary costs attached to transaction. They include cognitive costs (for instance the cost of 
deciding whether or not to do an action that may lead to a charge), time and information costs (for instance navi-
gating in the transaction management layers), privacy costs, uncertainty costs (when some rights are subject to 
further approval), locking-in (i.e. loss of freedom due to the fact that an information service will give you access 
only to specific sources, or will make it difficult for you to switch to another provider). In this sense […] control 
aspects are more rejected than the cost itself”. 
33
  See N. LUHMANN, “Trust: a mechanism for the reduction of social complexity”, in ID., Trust and 
Power: Two Works by Niklas Luhmann, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1979, pp. 1-103, at p. 35, who affirms 
that the trustor “has the possibility to set the norm according to which his reliance should not be betrayed (…). 
The impossibility of enchaining trust within a legal disposition does not entirely exclude trust from the domain 
of norms”. 
 (because it enables agents to deal with conditions of uncertainty and lack of knowledge), and 
thus high transaction cost, in order to be established.    
 
Conclusions 
The theoretical framework – within which we have analysed in what sense law can 
devise an act of mediation which determines the conditions of possibility of the representation 
of what is referred to as ‘virtual reality’ within the realm of what is referred to as ‘physical 
reality’ and vice versa – is thus structured by the inter-subjective computer-mediated interac-
tion and communication between individuals or groups. The rationality of the interaction be-
tween agents (whether human or artificial) is not actually defined in terms of certainties or 
acquired knowledge but rather in terms of shared expectations and social norms, which grow 
out of the communication process. 
 The rational criteria of inter-subjective interaction have been settled thanks to the me-
diation of law along two directions: on the one hand, law is entrenched with the role of devis-
ing how to protect reliance on information, which assures an ordered form of communication 
between agents, by qualifying what is conceived as reliable information by means of legal 
responsibility. On the other hand, law is concerned with setting the conditions of the commu-
nication process, by means of which agents can devise what is reasonable to expect from 
other agents, both in terms of relevant and reliable information (filters and means of modera-
tion and metamoderation) and in terms of trusting delegated tasks and behaviours (networked 
cooperation).  
In both perspectives, the relation between agents can be judged as an inter-subjective 
interaction, since the parties are transformed by the interaction itself. To speak more properly, 
the communication process constitutes the parties in their own subjectivity. Whether human 
or artificial, subjectivity is conceived in epistemological terms as the ability to set the criteria 
assessing how (virtual and physical) reality can be experienced and conceptualised at a given 
level of abstraction. Since this ability grows out of the communication process, it is not possi-
ble to determine, as a fixed certainty, what is to be taken for stable: the shared basis of our 
decisions and behaviours is the result of the reduction of complexity of the environment. The 
act of mediation of law between the real and the virtual plays a role in the process of reduc-
tion of complexity, which is not to be underestimated, if the interplay of intuitions (the phe-
nomenon to be represented: factual question) and concepts (the conditions of possibility of 
representation: legal question) deserves to be preserved.    
  
